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This work shows how a secure Internet can be implemented through a fast key distribution
system that uses physical noise to protect the transmitted information. Starting from a shared
random sequence K0 between two (or more) users, long sequences R of random bits can be shared
and not involving a third party. The signals sent over the Internet are deterministic but have a
built-in Nature-made uncertainty that protects the shared sequences. After privacy amplification
the shared R random bits –encrypted by noise– are subsequently utilized in one-time-pad data
ciphering. The physical generated protection is not susceptible to advances in computation or
mathematics. In particular, it does not depend on the difficulty of factoring prime numbers as
many cryptography systems rely on.
KeyWords: Cryptography, Physical Noise, Internet, Secret Key, No Third-Party, fast com-
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INTRODUCTION
The Internet is currently the main communication ve-
hicle for citizens in general, banks and E-commerce. Pro-
tocols based on mathematical complexities strive to offer
a secure Internet while hackers attempt to break in for
profits. As a matter of fact, the existing Internet offers
only tenuous security. While a few security providers
offer reasonable service within the current technological
landscape, they are vulnerable to technological advances.
A search for new paradigms to establish a secure Inter-
net but not sensitive to technological or mathematical
advances is ongoing.
This paper describes how to implement a practical se-
cure communication system for the Internet while avoid-
ing altogether protocols based purely on mathematical
complexities. This noise-encryption system relies on laws
of Nature but also avoids single-photon state protocols
such as BB84 [1]. Single-photon protocols cannot be
amplified and therefore do not work for the long-haul
communications necessary for the Internet. Furthermore,
signals from single-photon protocols cannot be converted
from optical to electrical and back to optical without loss
of security. Nor they are practical for wavelength multi-
plexing (WDM). These steps are necessary to the Inter-
net. Alternative systems such as those using discrete or
continuous variable processes and relying on homodyne
measurements (e.g., Ref. [2]) are very sensitive to noise,
which leads to low key rate transfer, and cannot work in
the naturally disturbed and complex Internet networks.
In the proposed implementation of a secure Internet
deterministic ciphered signals go through arbitrary com-
munication channels. They are ciphered by random sig-
nals from physical sources in nonorthogonal M -ry bases.
This system has evolved from a key distribution system
recently proposed [3, 4](See also [6] and [7]). This secure
Internet distributes deterministically random sequences
of bits to be utilized in a fast “one-time-pad” scheme.
A simplified but imperfect illustration of this system
based on physical noise would be a public radio station
emitter A that changes its carrier frequency in a very
fast and truly random way. A user B who possesses a
perfect knowledge of this random variation could set his
tuner to automatically lock onto it. A clear sound or mes-
sage would result. To an intruder who does not possess
any information on the carrier variations, only noise will
be detected. Actually, the presented cryptographic sys-
tem does not rely on frequency variations but on random
jumps among distinct nonorthogonal phase bases where
the bits are inscribed. This is as far as this analogy goes.
The security of the key distribution provided by this
system relies on a few points: 1) A shared secrecy by A
and B on a starting key sequence K0 and 2) a bit-by-bit
uncertainty Nature-made noise Ni associated to each bit
Ri and recorded on a interleaved M -ry nonorthogonal
basis. Knowledge of K0 gives for the legitimate users the
mapping of the bases jumps in the emitter and thus the
bit Ri inscribed on each basis. Privacy amplification pro-
cedures statistically exclude the eventually compromised
fraction of shared bits. The sequences of random bits Ri
will be generated by a truly random process and sent one-
by-one between users A (Alice) and B (Bob). The batch
of shared secret bits Ri will be used subsequently in one-
time-pad ciphering. The noise Ni protects each bit Ri
from the attacker E (Eve) and provides the information
security level associated with all shared Ri.
While this noise-secured Internet is logically equivalent
to the optical system discussed on Refs. [3] and [4] it has
a major distinctive feature: In Ref. [3] the noise arises
as part of the signal measurement by the attacker and
2is inherent to the optical field in a fiber channel. Here
the signal sent over the network is a recorded signal and,
as such, it is deterministic but contains bit information
Ri and the associated noise Ni. This is equivalent to
recording the results of an exceedingly noisy experiment
and giving them to two researchers for interpretation:
one that knows how to subtract the noise and the other
one, the attacker, that cannot get rid of the inherent
noise.
BASIC SCHEME
The signals are created by a physical random gener-
ator (PhRG). The noise Ni associated with the bit Ri
inscribed onto the M -ry nonorthogonal basis (M ≥ 2)
produces the uncertainty measured by the attacker. This
implies that the the emitter has to be equipped to detect
and record the signals generated by the PhRG. In other
words, the definition of the measuring system is made
by the emitter, not the attacker. The signal sent is the
signal controlled and measured by the emitter with a de-
tection system of his choice. No restrictions are placed
on the attacker to obtain the exchanged signals on a
public channel. She may obtain perfect copies of the
transmission. The signals emitted by the legitimate user
obey constraints imposed to provide full security. Among
the advantages of the proposed system are: 1) Any pub-
lic channel may be used for transmission (optical fibers,
TV, microwave, and so on); 2) The deterministic signals
can be amplified with no security loss; 3) Signals can
be converted from electromagnetic to electrical and back
to electromagnetic with no security loss; 4) Wavelength
multiplexing is allowed on the network; 5) Current Net-
work and IP protocols can be used with no modifications
for users in any IP classes. Fig. 1 shows a block diagram
for one cycle of the key distribution system. It describes
how legitimate users A and B distribute or transfer fresh
random key bits generated by a PhRG (to be described
ahead). Just to be more general, a description starting
with a M−ry system of levels will be presented. At the
end, this system will be simplified for a speed-up in the
communication process with no security loss.
A and B share a starting random key sequence
(#1) designated by K0 (#2) of length L (See Fig.
1). These L bits are divided into blocks of size kM
(b(kM ), b(kM−1), ...b(k1)) and each block defines ran-
domly a basis k0i over a nonorthogonal set of bases on a
ciphering wheel (#3) with M bases, where M = 2kM .
k0i = b(kM )2
kM−1 + b(kM−1)2
kM−2 + ...b(k1)2
0 . (1)
Given a k0i value (#4), a bit 0 could be inscribed, e.g.,
in a uniform ciphering wheel such as the one shown in
Ref. [3] where the phase values defining each basis are
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FIG. 1: A sketch of one cycle of operations of the key distri-
bution process in the Noise Secured Internet is shown.
given by
φk0i = π
[
k0i
M
+
1− (−1)k0i
2
]
, k0i = 0, 1, ...M − 1, (2)
and a bit 1 will be inscribed displaced by π with re-
spect to bit 0 over each basis. A PhRG (#5) generates
random bits R1i (#6) that A would like to transfer se-
curely to B. These signals contain noise N1i (#7) with
a natural phase distribution (e.g., Gaussian distributed)
of width σφ. R1i can be understood in phase units (rd):
values 0 or π for bits 0 and 1. The Gaussian distribu-
tion width σφ (Set such that σφ < π/2) may be written
σφ = πNσφ/M where Nσ is the number of bases cov-
ered by Ni (See Ref. [3]). The signal to be sent over
the generic Internet communication channel (#8) (net-
work and servers) is Y1 = R1i+N1i+k0i. The combined
effects of N1i + k0i is to hide the bit value R1i on the
ciphering wheel (#9). Although containing random in-
formation Y1 is a deterministic signal and as such can
be amplified and converted into different signals through
arbitrary nodes without any loss of security.
B has to extract R1i from Y1. To this end he utilizes
the same sequences from K0 utilized by A to generate
the base values k0i (#4). He subtracts this value from
Y1 and obtains R1i+N1i (#10) and obtain signals in bi-
nary bases (single ki value). The effect of the noiseN1i on
Bob’s binary basis is negligible because σφ < π/2 and his
decision on the bit value is easy; therefore, he obtains R1i
(#6). From the received sequence Ri he forms bit blocks
of length kM and constructs a new base sequence k1i.
The next steps are similar to the first ones. Bob’s PhRG
(#12) generates signal containing bits R2i (#13) associ-
ated to noiseN2i (#14). The signal Y2 = R2i+N2i+k1i is
sent over the communication channel (#8). The bit value
3R2i is hidden by the overall noise N2i+ k1i (#15). From
her knowledge of R1i (#6) and, therefore, k1i (#14), Al-
ice subtracts k1i from Y2 and obtains R2i + N2i (#16).
On her binary basis she easily obtains R2i (#13). The
first cycle is complete. A and B continue to exchange ran-
dom sequences as in the first cycle. The shared sequences
(R1i, ..., R2i, ...), after a privacy amplification process, are
the random bits to be subsequently utilized for one-time-
pad cipher.
Note that while for noiseless signals Y1 = b and Y2 = b
carrying a repeated bit b, one has Y1 ⊕ Y1 = 0, noisy
signals give Y1 = b+N1 and Y1 = b+N2 and, therefore,
Y1 ⊕ Y1 = N1 + N2(= 0 or1). This frustrates several
correlation attacks.
SOME SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Security analyses were presented for the purely opti-
cal counterparts of this M -ry key distribution system for
Internet and are equally valid here. Ref. [3] presented
a bit-by-bit analysis and [5] showed that the attacker’s
initial uncertainty on the whole sequence of shared bits is
equal to her uncertainty of the starting shared sequence
K0. This dependence on the first key shared key sequence
K0 can be seen from the mutual information, defined by
I(R : Y (R)) = H(R)−H(R|Y (R)) . (3)
I(R : Y (R)) is used to write the difference between the
mutual information between B and E in one cycle of
length L:
∆I = IB − IE
= [H(R)−H(R|YB(R))]− [H(R)−H(R|YE(R))]
= H(R|YE(R))−H(R|YB(R)) . (4)
Eve’s uncertainty on R given YE(R) is maximal
(H(R|YE(R))→ L) while Bob may obtain the whole se-
quence R from YB : H(R|YB(R)) = 0. Therefore, ∆I ≤ L
in the first cycle. Applying the chain rule
H(L1, L2, ..., Ln|YE) =
n∑
i=1
H(Li|Y, L1, ..., Li−1) , (5)
one may see that
H(L1, L2, ..., Ln|YE) =
=H(L1|YE) +H(L2|YE , L1) +H(L3|YE , L1, L2).. (6)
If the starting key (K0 with length L = L1) is open to
Eve, she obtains L2 (H(L2|YE , L1) = 0) in the same way
as Bob and also obtains all keys in the subsequent rounds.
The noise level superposed to the bits sent are designed
to hide each Lj from the attacker. Privacy amplification
–a necessary step– applied to the shared bits discards
information eventually leaked to the attacker and defines
the final shared length of secure bits.
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FIG. 2: Sketch of PhRG with a coherent light source. This
modulus can be added externally or externally to a computer.
The laser beam is divided by a beam splitter BS. The upper
part shows a detecting system where signals Vi are generated
corresponding to the sign of the generated signal with respect
to the average signal intensity. These binary signals are con-
verted into binary voltages VR = ±Vpi that constitute fresh
random bits to be shared by A and B. The bottom part shows
an interferometer with an optical phase modulator (φ mod) in
one of the arms. The laser beam is adjusted to an adequate
intensity by a neutral density filter (or automatized filter).
Voltage values VK0 defining M -ry phase bases (e.g, M = 2)
are added to VR and applied to the phase modulator. Detec-
tors at the interferometer output produce the phase signals
carrying basis, bit and noise information shown in Fig. 1 as
Yi.
THE PHYSICAL RANDOM GENERATOR
Fig. 2 sketches the PhRG and the input VK0 con-
taining recorded bases information. The PhRG generate
voltage signals corresponding to bits VR. These signals
are added to the basis information supplied by VK0 and
supplied to a phase modulator in one arm of an optical
interferometer. Output light is detected and converted
to phase signals (with respect to the laser field) that also
contain phase noise associated with coherent light. These
signals are written Yi in Fig. 1. As shown in Refs. [3]
and [4], this phase modulation of coherent signals pro-
duce signals that carry a phase uncertainty given by the
Gaussian distribution
pu ≃ e
−(∆φ)2/2σ2φ , (7)
where σφ =
√
2/〈n〉 and 〈n〉 is the average number of
photons in one bit. While several design variations are
possible, Fig. 2 shows basic parts to be considered. For
secure transmission of signals the physical randomness is
necessary as no known mathematical algorithm has been
proven to generate true random numbers. Several phys-
ical sources may be used alternatively such as optical or
thermal sources. However, optical sources can be much
faster than the thermal ones and are therefore necessary
4when speed is required. A PhRG can be seen as mod-
ulus that can be hooked (internally or externally) to a
computer linked to the Internet either in dedicated use
or open to users such as in a cybercafe. In such a pub-
lic system users may generate and record on portable
memories a batch of secure keys or use them to exchange
one-time-pad ciphered information.
One may also wonder about the cost of a brute force at-
tack to determine the starting key K0 from the transmit-
ted signals. Under the assumption that the uncertainty
presented to the attacker covers Nσ bases, the attacker
would know that the basis ki used in a given transmission
is around a given region within the uncertainty Nσ. For
a M -ry system of uniformly spaced bases this amounts
that only a set of less relevant bits b(kσ) in Eq. (1) hide
the correct basis. These b(kσ) bits could be permutated
in b(kσ)! ways. As each bit could be either 0 or 1 the
total number of permutations to be searched for each bit
emission would be (log2Nσ)!Nσ. For the total number
of K0 bits the number of combinations would be
C = 2K0(log2Nσ)!Nσ . (8)
Under this example of a uniform ciphering wheel exem-
plified by Eq. (2), it is understood that the attacker may
know the fraction 1 − (Nσ/M) of the total number of
shared bits kM used by A and B to cipher a fresh gen-
erated bit. For a sequence of L shared bits, Eve may
obtain L[1 − (Nσ/M)] bits among L because they were
not covered by noise. These bits have to be subsequently
discarded by A and B through privacy amplification pro-
cesses.
SIMPLIFIED BASES
Use of a non-uniform set of bases leads to a more eco-
nomical system: instead of a uniformly spaced circle of
phases given by Eq. (2) one may use just a sector of phase
values where the number of bases is just M = 2. See Fig.
3. The sector width or bases separation is made less than
2Nσ. Therefore, all bases will be within the phase fluc-
tuations caused by the noise Nj . Phase positions on this
sector are given by
φk0i =
[
k0i∆φ1 + π
1− (−1)k0i
2
]
, k0i = 0, 1. (9)
With this sector of phase bases the number of possible
combinations for a brute force attack searching for all
possibilities that may lead to K0 is C = 2 × 2
K0 . Rea-
sonable K0 lengths could be, say, ∼ 10
6, 109; they give a
number of combinations C to be tried that is not com-
putationally feasible.
Ref. [4] derived explicit equations for the mutual in-
formation of the process and showed numerical examples
to quantify security in terms of the difference of the mu-
tual information functions for A and B and A and E
2 2 2 / nφσ = ¢ ²
1φ∆
0k = 1k =
FIG. 3: A ciphering set of bases in a phase sector withM = 2.
σφ is the standard deviation in the phase caused by fluctua-
tions in the light field. ∆φ1 is the spacing between two bases
and should be kept ∆φ1 ≪ pi/2. 〈n〉 is adjusted so that
pi/2 > σφ ≫ ∆φ1, e.g. 〈n〉 < 100. Two states or bits can be
inscribed on each basis. Dark circles indicate positions for a
bit 0 and open circles give possible positions for a bit 1.
(IAE = ǫIAB , ǫ ≪ 1). As has also been shown, the
security of one sequence sent depends on the secrecy of
the former sequence received. This is an a-priori condi-
tion over which IAB > IAE follows. Statistically, the at-
tacker may acquire some bits correctly and the legitimate
users have to use privacy amplification protocols to elim-
inate that possible amount of information acquired by
Eve. Privacy amplification randomly reduce the number
of bits to eliminate possible information leaked to Eve.
A and B are able to share a large number of random se-
quences R≫ K0 before the bit reconciliation and privacy
amplification steps severely shorten the length L of the
sequences. These length reductions lead to a slow down
of the process and eventually to its halt. A convenient
minimum length Lmin can be chosen so that a new fresh
sequence K0 restarts the whole process. See Ref. [4] for
a discussion on the distillation process. The amount of
possible leakage can be estimated using mutual informa-
tion functions as shown in Ref. [4]. It was shown that a
fraction 1 − f (f ∼ 0.9991 in the example given) could
be compromised in every cycle; therefore, ∼ 0.1% should
be eliminated by privacy amplification protocols. As a
result, the remaining fraction f of bits in every cycle is
secure. A and B then succeed after many cycles in shar-
ing a number of secure bits much larger than the initial
shared sequence K0. With the example given in Ref. [4],
after sharing ∼ 103L bits, ∼ 660L (66%) will be distilled
by privacy amplification. Renewal of fresh starting se-
quences K0 was discussed in Refs. [3] and [4]. Ancient
methods such as hand-to-hand delivery and steganogra-
phy could be used for some applications. Even certi-
fied key providers may be acceptable for some uses. The
slow BB84 key distribution process could also be used to
5distribute the starting sequences K0 with proven secu-
rity; the speed of the key distribution process will then
boosted by the Noise Secured Internet system described
here.
CONCLUSIONS
It has been shown that two (or more) Internet users
starting from a shared secret sequence of random bits
K0 and adding a simple “hardware” modulus (PhRG) to
their computers will succeed in generating a large number
of secret keys to be used in one-time-pad cipher. The
system works at optical speed and does not require any
special Internet protocol. Signals associated with noise
are generated in the PhRG and the signals to be sent
are deterministic ones. The associated security is not
related to protocols based on mathematical complexities
in current use. This system is proposed as a possible new
paradigm for a secure Internet.
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